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Abstract 
Space based systems are looking more and more to the 
benefits from high performance, reconfigurable computing 
systems  and Commercial Of The Shelf components (COTS). 
One critical reliability concern is the behaviour of the 
complex integrated circuits in a radiation environment. Field 
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are well suited for the 
small volumes in space applications. This type of products  
are driven by the commercial sector, so devices intended for 
the space environment must be adapted from commercial 
product.  Heavy ion characterisation has been performed on 
several FPGA types and technologies to evaluate the on-
orbit radiation performance. As the geometry keeps 
shrinking, the relative importance of various radiation 
effects may change. Investigation of radiation effects on 
each technology generation is found to be necessary. This 
paper presents methodologies and results of radiation tests 
performed on commercial FPGA s for space applications. 
Mitigation of Single Event Upsets will be discussed.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Programmable logic has advantages over ASIC designs 
for the space community in the faster and cheaper 
prototyping, and reduced lead-time before flight. FPGAs 
based on antifuse technology are frequently used in space 
applications. Reprogrammable logic would offer additional 
benefit of allowing on-orbit design changes.  From Single 
Event Upsets point of view the antifuse technology has 
offered better control and reliability. However, mitigation 
methods for reprogrammable logic technologies are under 
constant development.  This paper discusses the Heavy Ion 
SEU testing of several Actel antifuse-based FPGAs and 
Xilinx Virtex FPGA.  
II.  RADIATION TEST SYSTEM 
A. Test Board 
The test system developed by Saab Ericsson Space 
consist of two boards, one Controller board managing the 
test sequence and the serial interface to the PC and one 
DUT-board housing two Devices Under Test (DUT). A 
schematic drawing is given in Fig.3. 
The Controller board tests one DUT at a time using a 
"virtual golden chip" test method. The principal of the 
measuring technique is to compare each output from the 
DUT with the correct data stored in SRAM’s. The general 
procedure for the tests are to load data into the devices 
under test, pause for a pre-set time, read data out, and 
analyse the errors for various error type signatures. New 
data are loaded into the DUT at the same time as old are 
read out. When an error is detected (when outputs do not 
match), the state of all outputs and position in cycle of the 
failing shift register will be temporarily stored in FIFOs. Data 
in the FIFOs is continually send to a PC through a RS232 
serial interface. After each test run the data are analysed 
and stored in a database by the controlling PC. For each 
DUT, errors can be traced down to the logic module, logic 
value and position. 
 
 
B. Test Facility 
Heavy ion tests were performed at the CYClotron of 
LOuvain la NEuve (CYCLONE), Belgium. This accelerator 
can cover an energy range of 0.6 to 27.5 MeV/AMU for 
heavy ions produced in a double stage ECR source. The 
use of an ECR source allow the acceleration of an ion 
"cocktail" composed of ions with very close mass over 
charge ratio. The preferred ion is selected by fine-tuning of 
the magnetic field or a slight change of the RF frequency. 
Within the same cocktail it takes only a few minutes to 
change ion species. 
 
The facility provides beam diagnostic and control with 
continuous monitoring of beam fluence and flux via plastic 
scintillators. The irradiations are performed in a large 
vacuum chamber with the test board mounted on a movable 
frame. Normally each device is tested with a variety of 
atomic species up to a fluence of 1e+6- 1e+7 ions/cm2, 
depending on the cross section for the device under test. 
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III. ANTIFUSE FPGA TECHNOLOGY 
 
FPGA’s from Actel Corporation are widely used in 
Aerospace applications. The company has been providing 
products to the stringent space requirements  for several 
years. During the last years several new products have 
been introduced with the aim of having improved radiation 
resistance and logic circuit density.  
The company uses several different manufacturers for 
the wafer production. Only wafers manufactured by 
Matshushita (MEC) are used in the products for space. The 
same products sold under the same electrical specification 
are likely manufactured in several fabs. Some of these 
products have been tested for total dose and found only 
good for a few krad(Si) total dose. Over the years there have 
been many SEU tests using heavy ions performed on Actel 
products, both to determine the SEU probability for the user 
logic’s as well as determining effects of heavy ions on the 




IV. RESULTS ON ANTIFUSE FPGA  
All results presented below have been tested with the 
same test method and test board described above. 
 













 Figure 1 Heavy ion data on Actel A14100A S-module for 
5V and 3.3V biasing conditions. Flip from logic “0” to 
logic “1” is noted S0. The opposite is noted S1. The 






A. Actel A14100A 
This FPGA is manufactured by Matshushita (MEC) in 
antifuse ONO gate 0.8mm two-level metal CMOS technology 
with 1153 logic modules. The SEU behaviour of this device 
is very typical for Actel devices. Biasing at 3.3V give a 
higher SEU probability. Actel has a large asymmetry in the 
flip-flop sensitivity between flip from logic  “zero” to logic 
“one” compared to the reverse. This device type has been 
on the market for several years and according to Actel there 
are at the moment no plans to take it out of the market. This 
device type has been designed in on many spacecraft’s, but 
only a few have been launched so far. 
 
B. Actel RT54SX16 
This FPGA is manufactured by Matshushita (MEC) in 
antifuse metal-to-metal gate 0.6mm 3-metal CMOS 
technology. This device type exists in a 32 kgate version as 
well. However, the device types became obsolete before it 
came out on the market because MEC decided to close 
down the 0.6mm line.  
The SEU behaviour of this device is very similar to 
A14100A. The large asymmetry in the flip-flop sensitivity 
between flip from logic  “zero” to logic “one” compared to 
the reverse could be observed here as well. The total dose 
tolerance for this type is around 50 krad(Si) compared to 
that of  A14100A which only around 10-15 krad(Si). There 
are large differences in total dose tolerance between 
different production lots  of these types .  
Critical functions in space applications must be triple 
module redundant to mitigate for SEU. This consumes large 
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Figure 2. Heavy ion data on Actel RT54SX16 R-module. 
The data for A14100A are shown as dashed curves.  
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V. SRAM FPGA TECHNOLOGY  
The Xilinx Virtex FPGA is an SRAM based device that 
supports a wide range of configurable gates from 50k to 1M.  
It is fabricated on thin-epitaxial silicon wafers using the 
commercial mask set and the Xilinx 0.25µ CMOS process 
with 5 metal layers.  SEU risks dominate in the use of this 
technology for most applications.  In particular, the 
reprogrammable nature of the device presents a new 
sensitivity due to the configuration bitstream.  The function 
of the device is determined when the bitstream is 
downloaded to the device.  Changing the bitstream changes 
the design’s function.  While this provides the benefits of 
adaptability, it is also an upset risk.  A device configuration 
upset may result in a functional upset.  User logic can also 
upset in the same fashion seen in fixed logic devices.  These 
two upset domains are referred to as configuration upsets 
and user-logic upsets. Two features of the Virtex 
architecture can help overcome upset problems.  The first is 
that the configuration bitstream can be read back from the 
part while in operation, allowing continuous monitoring for 
an upset in the configuration and the part supports partial 
reconfiguration, which allows for real-time SEU correction. 
Secondly, Triple Module Redundancy (TMR) can be 
implemented in order to filter out SEU effects. 
 
VI. TEST METHODS FOR SRAM FPGA 
A. SRAM Bitstream Readback 
On the test board described above, a configuration 
controller chip on the DUT-board is controlling a PROM 
and configuration ports of the DUT. A program command 
can be sent to the DUT, which clears its configuration 
memory and starts an automatic re-configuration of the 
 
Figure 3 Schematic drawing of DUT board with 
configuration interface for the Virtex device 
 
DUT from the PROM During the test of the DUT the 
configuration controller is  continuously scrubbing the DUT 
configuration memory with new configuration data from the 
PROM’s. A schematic drawing of the test board is shown in 
Fig 3 
All data from the PROM’s to the DUT is transferred 
through the parallel SelectMAP interface, which supports 
the partial configuration feature making it possible to 
continuously scrub the device with new configuration data 
during operation.  
 
B. Error Separation 
 Errors could originate from SEU in registers of the 
device, SEU in the configuration data causing functional 
errors in parts of the device and from errors in control 
registers of the device causing global functional errors. The 
analysed data errors are separated into three different 
domains, SEU in registers, SEU in configuration data, and 
SEU in device control registers. 
SEU in the register is corrected with the new data loaded 
into the DUT. The error will not last in next test cycle. 
SEU in the configuration data would be permanent until 
the device is scrubbed with new configuration data. The 
SEU gives an error in only part of the device and could, for 
example, corrupt the function of one of the shift registers in 
the DUT. This means that the shift  register will be out of 
function until the configuration data is corrected with new 
data. 
The control register “POR” controls the initialisation 
sequence of the device when it powers up. An SEU in this 
register could change state of the whole device by initiating 
a complete clearing of the configuration memory. This type 
of error is detected when all shift registers go out of 
function at the same time. 
 
C. DUT Designs 
Two design methods were tested for comparison, TMR 
and non-TMR designs. Both designs have the same basic 
functionality. The TMR version uses the Triple Module 
Redundancy design techniques that Xilinx recommends for 
use with the Virtex FPGA [3]. The non-TMR design is a 
standard design used for Actel antifuse as well. 
The non-TMR design, schematically shown in figure 4, 
implements into the device 14, 144 stage, pipeline shift 
register and a small self test circuit. 
The TMR design, schematically shown in figure 5, 
implements a functionally equivalent circuit as the non-
TMR design but with full internal triple redundancy. The 
outputs of the TMR design use triple tri-state drivers to 
filter data errors from the output. 
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Figure 4 Schematic drawing of non-TMR DUT design 
 
D. Other Test Considerations 
An SEU in configuration data causing a functional error 
is corrected when new configuration data is written to the 
DUT. To be able to detect all of these errors the DUT must 
be continuously tested. Since the DUT is paused in our 
tests , we will not see all of these errors. Therefor we have to 
estimate the fraction of errors that we detect (Detection 
factor). 
Two different pause times (time where DUT is not 
clocked between read/write of data) are used during the 
tests, 223ms and 4ms. Testing the non-TMR design mostly 
used the long pause time since the flow of error data was 
too high. 
The test system allows selecting the scrub time between 
10,38ms / 22,93ms and 166ms. The longer scrubbing rates 





VII. SRAM TEST RESULTS 
Each test was performed with a variety of atomic species 
up to a fluence of 1e+6 ions/cm2, or until either one of the 
shift registers was permanently disabled by the “Persistent” 
error or all 14 shift registers were eliminated by the “SEFI” 
error. With this error in a shift register no data came out and 
the registers couldn’t be tested. The fluence is calculated 
from the total fluence of the test and the mean value until 
each Persistent or SEFI type error. In this way the fluence of 
when the device is actually tested is achieved. 
 
 
Figure 5 Schematic drawing of TMR DUT design 
 
A. Configuration induced Error types 
Errors that are caused by SEU in the configuration are 
quantified by observing the following signatures in the test 
data: The results are shown in figure 6 
1) Routing  
An SEU in the configuration logic (routing bits and 
lookup tables) may cause errors in the configured function 
of the operational device. This gives errors from the shift 
registers that are permanent until next time the device is 
scrubbed with new configuration data. 
2) Persistent  
A persistent error is a permanent error that is not 
corrected with new configuration data. The device needs to 
be reset to correct this error. This is the result of SEU in 
“week keeper” circuits used in the Virtex architecture when 
logical constants are implied in the configured design such 
as unused clock enable signals for registers. 
3) SelfTest  
SelfTest errors are of same type as the routing type, but 
instead of interrupting a shift  register it interrupts the 
function of the SelfTest module. 
4) SEFI type  
Function of the whole device is interrupted in one hit  
and all shift register data is lost. The device requires a reset 
and complete reconfiguration for correction. 
These errors are tested in a dynamic way, but due to 
limitations of the test system the device is rested between 
clocking of data. Since the device is continuously scrubbed 
with new configuration data, there will be a significant 
amount of errors of the routing and SelfTest data not seen 
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at read out (corrected before read out). The detection factor 
correlates the results for this. 
 
5) Non-TMR design 
At a LET of 2.97 MeV/mg/cm2 each configuration type 
error was observed. Cross-sections are presented in Fig. 6. 
The presented data for all configuration type errors are 
correlated with an estimated “detection factor”. With a 
scrub time of 10 ms and a pause time of 4 ms the detection 
factor is estimated to be 0.6 and with the longer pause time 
of 223 ms, it is estimated to be 0.05. 
The cross section is specific for this design. To predict 
cross section for a 100% utilised device you must multiply 
these cross sections with the utilisation factor for this 
design (about 32% for the routing errors and maybe 5% for 
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Figure 6 Configuration errors for non-TMR Design. The cross 
sections are per device and are specific for this design. For the 
non-TMR design one SEFI type error was recorded, at a LET of 
14.1 MeV/mg/cm2. This is likely due to the very low fluence 
required for the test to finish. Arrows indicate test without any 
errors. 
 
6) TMR design 
The SEFI type error was the only observable error type. 
The Persistent error is not observed. The SEFI was 
observed at a LET of 5.85 MeV/mg/cm2. This demonstrated 
that the TMR design method effectively eliminated all non-
SEFI configuration induced errors. 
The “SEFI type” error is believed to be an SEU in the 
POR control register, clearing the whole device from 
configuration data. All I/Os are 3-stated in this state and 
this was detected at the read out data, which slowly went 
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Figure 7 Configuration errors for TMR Design. Except for SEFI 
errors only one “routing” error was recorded at a LET of 14.1 
MeV/mg/cm2. Arrows indicate test without any upsets. 
 
In one test run a “Routing” error was observed. The flux 
was ~1333 ions/cm2/s and the device were scrubbed with 
new configuration data every 10,38ms. This gives a 
flux/scrub-cycle ratio of 13ions/cm2/scrub.  
Xilinx has reported that the number of accumulated 
configuration bit upsets to cause a functional failure in a 
TMR design ranges between 2 and 30 bits. It is therefore 
possible that enough errors in the configuration logic were 
allowed to accumulate before the next scrub cycle to cause 
the error. Therefore, the observed errors are most likely an 
artefact of the flux/scrub-cycle ratio. 
 
B. Register Error Types 
These errors are tested in a static fashion. Data is 
clocked into the shift registers, held for a pre-set time, and 
then clocked out for comparison. The procedure is repeated 
constantly during the test run. The data are analysed for 
single bit errors and categorised into the following error 
types: 
FF(0-1) Read ‘1’ from flip-flop registers when ‘0’ is 
expected. 
FF(1-0) Read ‘0’ from flip-flop registers when ‘1’ is 
expected. 
FF A summation of all FF errors (above) read from the shift 
registers. 
DataSwap This was an error type that had two errors in 
registers next to each other in the register chain. First a ‘0’ 
was read when ‘1’ was expected and in the next register a ‘1’ 
is read when a ‘0’ was expected. This error was isolated for 
two registers in the whole chain of 144 registers and didn’t 
occur again in the next test cycle. 
One possible explanation for this error type is that a 
routing bit error was being corrected just as test data was 
being read out for comparison. 
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1) Non-TMR design 
FF errors were observed at a LET greater than 2.97 
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Figure 8 Register errors for non-TMR Design. Arrows 
indicate test without any upsets. 
 
2) TMR design 
Only one FF error was observed at a LET 14.1 
MeV/mg/cm2 with an estimated cross-section of ~5e-10cm2. 
No other FF errors were recorded in absence of a SEFI type 
error. It is considered that this error is the result of the 
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Figure 10 SEFI errors for non-TMR and TMR design. 
The non-TMR tests were performed to less fluence than the 
TMR, therefor less SEFI errors have been observed for non-
TMR design. In principal the SEFI error cross section 
should be the same for the two designs. With the 
assumption the control registers have the same heavy ion 
sensitivity as the user registers. The number of fatal failure 
control bits of the device seems to be around ten. The LET 
threshold of the SEFI errors would with this assumption be 







VIII PROTON INDUCED SEU 
The main mechanism in energy loss leading to single 
event phenomena is due to inelastic collisions between 
incident protons and atoms in the substrate. The recoiling 
nucleus will thus be the particle that causes the SEU. The 
final mechanism for proton induced SEU is therefore very 
similar to that envisaged for heavy ions. 
In Fig 11 below are proton data from Actel A14100A and 
Xilinx Virtex shown. The cross sections for proton SEU are a 
factor 10-8 lower than those observed for heavy ions. The 
low threshold observed for Xilinx manifest itself in the 
sensitivity for low energetic protons. For A14100A, is likely 
only the flip of logic “0” to logic “1” that is observed in the 
proton SEU. Circuits having a threshold higher than LET= 
















Fig 11 Proton upsets as a function of proton Energy for 
Actel A14100A and Xilinx Virtex QRV300. For Actel 
A14100A, no  proton upsets have been observed at 
energies below 150 MeV. The results for Xilinx is taken 












 Page 7 
IX SINGLE EVENT TRANSIENTS 
In addition to “conventional” SEUs, charge particles can 
also induce transients in combinatorial logic, in global clock 
lines and in global control lines. These single event 
transients (SET) have only minor effects on technologies 
around 0.8-0.5 mm since the speed of these circuits are 
insufficient to propagate the 100 to 200 ps wide SET pulse 
any appreciable distance. However, as smaller feature size 
technologies are being used in spaceborne systems, these 
transients become indistinguishable from normal circuit 
signals. 
If a charge particle strike occurs within the combinatorial 
logic block of a sequential circuit, and the logic is fast 
enough to propagate the induced transient, then the SET 
will eventually appear at the input of data latch where it may 
be interpreted as a valid signal. Similar invalid transient data 
might appear at the outputs of lookup tables and on routing 
lines due to SETs generated in the programming elements. 
While conventional SEU error rates are independent of 
the chip clock frequency, SET increase in direct proportion 
of the operating frequency. Smaller feature size results in 
smaller gate delays that permit circuits to be operated at 
higher clock frequencies. For typical FPGA designs, SET 
induced error rates may actually exceed the SEU rate of 




Fig.12 Critical Transient Width vs Feature Size for 
unattenuated propagation. The picture is taken from Ref 
[4] 
 
In figure 12 is illustrated the critical transient pulse width 
as function of technology feature size needed to propagate 
without attenuation through any number of gates [x].  At 
pulse widths smaller than the critical width, the inherent 
inertial delay of the gate will cause the transient to be 
attenuated and the pulse will after passing a few gates die 
out. At pulse widths equal or larger than the critical width, 
the transient will propagate through the gate just as though 
it was a normal circuit signal. 
 
 
A. RT54SX-S Details 
 
The architecture of Actel RT54SX-S devices is an 
enhanced version of Actel SX-A device architecture. The 
RT54SX-S devices are manufactured using a 0.25µm 
technology at the Matsushita (MEC) facility. The RT54SX-S 
family incorporates up to four layers of metal interconnects. 
To achieve good SEU requirements each register cell (R-
Cell) in the RT54SX-S are build up with Triple Module 
Redundancy (TMR) The R-cells in the SX-S device consists 
of three master and three slave latches gated by opposite 
edges of the clock. The feedback path of each of the three 
latches is voted with the outputs of the other two latches. If 
one of the three latches is struck by an ion and starts to 
change state, the voting with the other two latches prevents 
the change from feeding back and permanently latching. 
With this solution the latches is continuously corrected 
and theoretically the only possibility for a SEU in a R- 
register is to have two latches hit by two ions within the 




B. SEU Results of RT54SX32-S 
No SEU in the R-register cells have been observed 
under static conditions up to LET= 64.5 MeV/cm2/mg.   
Irradiation with heavy ions under 5 MHz dynamic 
condition resulted in errors, which had the same signature 
as if they were proper SEU. When lowering the FPGA 
operating frequency by a factor of 4 to 1.25 MHz no errors 
could be observed. From the static condition test it was 
concluded that the R-cells do not upset. Thus, the errors 
observed in 5 MHz dynamic mode are very likely due to 
transient effects SET which are clocked through to the 
output.  
The duration and magnitude of the transients are, 
however, technology and circuitry design dependent. In the 
present experimental set-up it is not possible to isolate the 
error data to certain areas or functions of the device.  
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Fig 13 Single Event Transient cross section as a 
function of LET value for RT54SX32S. Errors have only 
been detected in 5 MHz dynamic test mode. The data 
points with arrows indicate fluence for test run without 
errors. The error bars are the standard deviation 
indicating counting statistics for each test run. No 






Test results presented in this paper are all on COTS type 
of FPGAs. The use of COTS in radiation environment 
require, however, that testing to the needed reliability 
requirements are performed.  A vast majority of complex 
IC’s will not pass the minimum requirement of being latch-
up free in a charge particle environment. Once the single 
event upset problems have been characterised there are 
techniques to mitigate the SEU problems. Such knowledge 
helps selecting between hardened technologies and speed 
and area trade-offs in a softer technology. With decreasing 
feature size, the single event transients will become more 
important. For frequencies above 100 MHz, the probabilities 
are in the same order as for conventional upsets. So far no 
experimental data have been published which show the 
transient probabilities at proton energies for complex CMOS 
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